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In Furman v. Georgia the Supreme Court, by a vote of five to four,
declared capital punishment as administered under discretionary death
penalty statutes cruel and unusual and thus in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. In confronting the issues in Furman,
the Court was put in the position of either finding some formulation
for holding the death penalty unconstitutional or sending hundreds
to their deaths. The Court was put in this impossible position largely
because in previous years only a small portion of those convicted of
capital crimes had actually been executed. The understandable re-
luctance of prosecutors, jurors, trial and appellate judges, and gover-
nors to administer the death penalty had been exploited by the cadre
of lawyers associated with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the
American Civil Liberties Union. From 1963 onward, they planned
and argued a series of cases designed to eliminate capital punishment
in an artfully coordinated litigation campaign.
In Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court and Capital Punish-
ment,.' Professor Michael Meltsner of Columbia University,2 one of
these lawyers, relates the history of the recent abolitionist movement
-a history which is relevant not only for those who must consider the
present efforts to restore the death penalty, but especially for those
lawyers and judges planning or facing concerted litigative strategies
in constitutional, civil rights, or poverty law cases. In this edited ex-
cerpt from his book, Professor Meltsner describes the birth of the
1. To be released this fall by Random House. 0 by Michael Meltsner.
2. A.B., Oberlin College, 1957; LL.B., Yale Law School, 196i0. Professor of Law,
Columbia University School of Law.
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moratorium strategy and one of the more unusual episodes in the
abolitionist campaign-the defeat of efforts by the governors of Florida
and California to renew the executions by the use of novel class action
habeas corpus petitions.
In 1966, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF)
war council of capital case lawyers made a decision which was to de-
termine the path of their efforts for the next six years: Henceforth
they would attempt to block all executions. They would defend mur-
derers as well as rapists, whites as well as blacks, Northerners as well
as Southerners.
It is not easy to trace the evolution of this change in policy, for it
came about only after a number of complex, interrelated, tactical and
moral considerations coalesced, but of its importance there can be
no doubt. One factor prompting the decision was the unpleasant les-
son taught by the reaction of the courts to attempts to prove racial
discrimination in the death sentencing of Southern black rapists: not-
withstanding that the evidence was as convincing as men with finite
resources could produce, judges resisted an argument that on the basis
of statistics asked them to brand hundreds of juries as prejudiced.
Proof of racial discrimination in rape sentencing might ultimately in-
fluence judges to require tighter procedure in capital cases; and if the
lawyers unearthed more facts, judges might even come to accept the
statistical argument itself. But such results were unlikely for several
years, and they would never be possible unless the fact that such a high
proportion of blacks were subject to execution emerged as but one
distasteful aspect of a far greater evil. For this to occur, the courts
had to take a fresh look at the venerable institution of capital punish-
ment. In turn, to catch the conscience of the courts, the death penalty
had to be a "problem"-one that was discussed, attracted attention and,
in a more immediate way than in the past, affected the lives of the
judges and prison officials who administered it. Abolition needed a
symbol, a threat of crisis, to overcome inertia and win favor from a
reluctant judiciary.
One way to promote this end was to raise the entire range of capital
punishment arguments in every case where execution was imminent,
thereby stopping the killing and eventually presenting any resump-
tion of it as likely to lead to a blood bath. The politics of abolition
boiled down to this: For each year the United States went without
executions, the more hollow would ring claims that the American
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people could not do without them; the longer death-row inmates wait-
ed and the greater their numbers, the more difficult it would be for
the courts to permit the first execution. A successful moratorium
strategy would create a death-row logjam. Regardless of political stripe,
there were very few governors who wished to preside over mass ex-
ecutions. Even if the state legislatures did not abolish the death pen-
alty despite the threat of numerous gassings and electrocutions, many
chief executives might readily acquiesce in any judicial action that
would permit them to avoid scores of clemency decisions.
But there were dangers, not to mention difficulties, in agreeing
to represent every death-row inmate who sought LDF assistance. It
was a close question whether a particular Fund client would be helped
by tying his fate to a general campaign against the death penalty. Test
cases have a way of scaring off judges because their implications are
so enormous. Thus, if the strategy worked and capital punishment was
abolished or severely restricted, the racially discriminatory sentences
complained of by LDF clients would be eliminated. But if the strategy
failed, Southern black rapists as a class might actually be far worse
off than before because, to cite one consideration that troubled the
lawyers, a general challenge to capital punishment tended to lump
together men who had killed with men who had not, creating a situa-
tion in which the fate of the nonkillers would be likely to hinge on
the fate of the whole.
In fact, had there not been other forces at work, LDF lawyers
might have stuck to representing Southern black rapists and only
taken on cases of blacks convicted of murder when they believed that
justice had miscarried or that racial discrimination was involved. But
once the lawyers knew the legal theories that could win stays of ex-
ecution, they felt morally obliged to use them. "We could no more
let men die that we had the power to save," Professor Anthony Am-
sterdam commented, "than we could have passed by a dying accident
victim sprawled bloody and writhing on the road without stopping
to render such aid as we could." Indeed, the lawyers confronted a
choice as immediate as if they had stumbled on a highway smash-up.
Calls for help were coming in from all parts of the nation: the gov-
ernors of California, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas had signed death
warrants.
For the moratorium strategy to work, Fund lawyers would have to
intervene directly in hundreds of cases in over thirty of the forty-two
jurisdictions whose law still provided the death penalty. Even if LDF
declined to enter a case until after a defendant lost at trial and com-
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pleted his first state court appeal, the undertaking was massive and
without precedent. Legal papers that could be used in each capital
punishment state were a necessity. The Fund required men and
money it simply did not have. It was essential to develop relationships
of confidence and trust with scores of lawyers and other professionals.
Amsterdam began to forge a strategy by circulating elaborately
documented drafts of legal arguments designed to show that standard-
less jury sentencing, the single-verdict procedure (only California,
Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas had split trials),
and the exclusion of scrupled jurors violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The money became available in 1967 when the Ford Foundation
granted the Fund a million dollars to create a National Office for
the Rights of the Indigent (NORI) program-conceived by Fund
staff attorney Leroy Clark-to bring test cases to improve treatment
of the poor by the legal system. Although the Ford Foundation prob-
ably did not have capital punishment in mind when it made the
grant, it had authorized NORI to go to court to upgrade the quality
of criminal justice. And it was undeniable that the elaborate trials
and numerous appeals involved in capital cases swallowed up large
amounts of money which the states could have used to supply des-
perately needed services for indigent defendants; many also thought
discrimination against the poor in the application of capital punish-
ment more blatant than discrimination against blacks. For these rea-
sons, Jack Greenberg, director-counsel of the Fund, decided to use
the Ford money to finance abolition cases.
Soon after the moratorium strategy was announced, criminal lawyers
invited the Fund to defend murder cases, involving both blacks and
whites in California, New Jersey, and Colorado-states where LDF
activity had been slight. Overburdened public defender agencies and
death-row inmates themselves sought LDF assistance. By March 1967,
the Fund was responsible for over fifty men subject to execution, and
the number climbed each month. With no shortage of potential clients,
it was soon apparent that a staff lawyer had to be given full respon-
sibility to manage the growing docket of death cases and to coordinate
the efforts of those attorneys who sought LDF assistance. A national
moratorium strategy demanded that each cooperating lawyer quickly
learn the latest developments and, when necessary, receive fresh plead.
ings and briefs.
The small group of staff attorneys who had worked on capital cases
was familiar with the pressures of applying for last-minute stays of
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execution and gerry building legal arguments overnight. Now there
was need for a theoretician and planner-a managing attorney who
would collect evidence demonstrating the barbarity of death-row in-
carceration, and the character of death case juries; engage psych ia-
trists to study the deterioration of men awaiting execution; induce
pollsters and statisticians to measure the bias of the jurors who re-
mained after those with scruples against capital punishment had been
removed; and find churchmen, wardens, and correctional officials to
lend their prestige.
Further, the managing attorney had to interest law professors in
generating imaginative constitutional theories based on evolving doc-
trine, and interest law students in documenting the varied forms taken
by capital case procedure in different states. He had to cultivate jour-
nalists in order to persuade them that something newsworthy was
happening in a field in which they had rarely shown sustained in-
terest. Most importantly, he had to stand a death watch: On learning
of an imminent execution, he had to find a lawyer willing to take
the case and place the proper papers in his hands.
I recommended that Greenberg offer the job to Jack Himmelstein,
a twenty-six-year-old Harvard Law School graduate, who some years
earlier when he was still a student had held a summer research job
with the Fund. During law school, Himmelstein had attended several
Harvard Medical School classes to obtain clinical experience in psy-
chiatry, but only after winning a battle with a fussy law school ad-
ministrator who thought he should register for more commercial law
courses. After graduation, with a Knox Fellowship in psychiatry and
law, he went to England to study civil commitment of the mentally
ill. In London he spent most of his time at the Anna Freud Clinic
at Hampstead, an experience which later helped him see beyond the
legalisms to the tortured psychic reality of each death case.
Shortly after Himmelstein officially started work, Amsterdam drove
him to Philadelphia from a Fund Conference in Virginia. In the
four-hour trip he learned, issue by issue and step by step, the nature
of the legal challenge to capital punishment and where it might lead.
For the next five years hardly a week passed, and for long periods
not a day, when these two men did not speak together. Their first
joint project was to draft a set of petitions for habeas corpus, appli-
cations for stay of execution, and legal briefs that articulated every
significant constitutional argument against the death penalty. The
collection, dubbed the "Last Aid Kit," was bound and distributed
to hundreds of lawyers. The papers in the "Kit" were arranged so
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that even an attorney totally unfamiliar with the Fund's legal strategy
found himself able, upon minimum inspection, to present a court with
substantial legal reasons for postponing an execution.
With circulation of the "Last Aid Kit," requests for LDF inter-
vention in capital cases grew steadily; Himmelstein opened a file for
every man on death row. He prepared a list of lawyers in every
capital punishment state willing to participate in capital cases and
coaxed several of the attorneys into serving as state reporters, com-
mitted to keeping him informed of scheduled executions and changes
in local law.
Next, Himmelstein and Amsterdam expanded the latter's already
prodigious correspondence with interested lawyers to include scholars
Hugo Bedau, Leslie Wilkins, Hans Mattick, Hans Ziesel and Harry
Kalven, and psychiatrists Dr. Bernard Diamond and Dr. Louis J. West.
They talked to prison wardens and psychologists who had studied
the deleterious effects of death-row incarceration; abolitionists like
Ruth Kitchen of the New York Committee to Abolish Capital Pun-
ishment, Sol Rubin of the National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency, Donald E. J. MacNamara of the American League to Abolish
Capital Punishment, and Douglas Lyons, who as a college student
had formed Citizens Against Legalized Murder (CALM).
In 1967 Lyons had held a vigil at San Quentin to protest the ex-
ecution of Aaron Mitchell; in 1968, he helped arrange hearings on
a federal abolition bill for a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee chaired
by Senator Philip Hart. Later, while a law student and a part-time
Fund staff member, he continually checked with prison wardens, gov-
ernors' offices, and interested lawyers to learn whether there were
executions scheduled. Most of the time, he was told "None this month."
Every so often, however, Lyons learned of a previously unknown ex-
ecution date. Working in this manner, he provided Himmelstein with
information which led to last-minute stays of execution for over thirty
men.
By May of 1968, almost twelve months had elapsed without a legal
killing. Due largely to Himmelstein's spadework, LDF felt confident
enough to assemble over a hundred lawyers and abolitionists for a
National Conference on Capital Punishment in New York. At the
opening of the meeting, Greenberg gave a moving speech which al-
luded to the years not so long before when every Southern capital
trial was a potential lynching, and described the background of the
Fund's involvement. In stacatto style, Amsterdam then gave an over-
view of the legal strategy. Finally each of the major legal constitutional
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claims was analyzed in some detail by speakers from various law
schools: Caleb Foote of the University of California at Berkeley;
Donald MacDonald of the University of Colorado; John Griffiths
and Stephen Duke of Yale.
The purpose of the 1968 conference, however, was not technical;
its aim was to bring the participants together for a face-to-face en-
counter, and at this it succeeded handsomely. This first confrontation
of numerous professionals who had previously worked alone gave the
movement a cohesion that it had lacked. Largely because of this con-
ference, those who were present came to accept the Fund's role as
overseer and clearinghouse. As a result, in the years that folowed, no
execution date went unchallenged.
In 1968 Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy, two men who
carried the hopes of many for a reconstructed America, were assas-
sinated. Both murders took place in death penalty states, committed
by men who were obviously undeterred. For many who attended the
1968 conference, especially Fund lawyers who had worked closely
with Dr. King for years, his assassination dramatized as could nothing
else the senselessness of killing, unofficial or official. If some dreamed
of revenge, the impotence of such feelings to bring back men who
were loved for their presence or the hopes they evoked reinforced
the disgust with which the lawyers contemplated the prospect of more
legal death. Ironically, this most miserable year in that "slum of a
decade," to use John Updike's oft-quoted phrase, strengthened aboli-
tionist resolve; it was also the year that brought the first two Supreme
Court decisions which significantly limited state power to impose
the death penalty. In both cases, the Court acted in a way which
opened up the prospect of endless litigation, if not ultimate success.
II
In 1932 an increasing number of professional kidnapings (the most
notorious that of Charles Lindbergh's child) and the limited ability
of local authorities to cope with interstate flight led Congress to en-
act a federal kidnaping statute3-better known as the Lindbergh law
--which made the crime punishable by death only if the defendant
charged with harming the kidnaped person chose to plead not guilty
and to go to trial before a jury rather than a judge. In other words,
if a defendant pled guilty, or waived his right to trial by jury, a judge
could sentence him to no more than life imprisonment.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (1970).
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In 1966 a Connecticut federal grand jury had charged three men,
Charles "Batman" Jackson, Glenn LaMotte and John Albert Walsh,
with the kidnaping of John Joseph Grant, a truck driver whose load
of razor blades had been hijacked and taken from Connecticut to New
Jersey. Because Grant had suffered rope burns while freeing himself,
he had been harmed sufficiently to invoke the death penalty provisions
of the law.
Before Jackson and his codefendants pleaded to the indictment, the
federal district court in New Haven appointed Stephen Duke to serve
as one of his lawyers. Professor Duke, a former clerk to Justice Douglas,
had joined the faculty of the Yale Law School in 1961 as a tax professor
but soon became interested in criminal law. After receiving word of
his appointment, Duke examined the Lindbergh law and noticed a po-
tential defect in the statute which apparently had never been chal-
lenged in the more than thirty years it had been on the books-that
it coerced defendants to plead guilty and to waive trial by jury by
making them risk their lives only if they contested their guilt before
a jury. On this basis, Duke filed a motion to dismiss Jackson's indict-
ment.
United States District Judge William Timbers agreed and dismissed
the charge.4 He thought the entire kidnaping statute unconstitutional
because it had an inherent tendency to impair the right to trial by
jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The government appealed
directly to the Supreme Court, which in 1968 upheld Duke's con-
tention that the kidnaping statute wrongly encouraged an accused to
plead guilty and to waive his right to a jury trial.5
The government's argument that trial judges police pleas of guilty
and waivers of jury trials is no answer to the statute's invitation to
avoid death only at the price of waiving rights, wrote Justice Potter
Stewart for the Court." "[T]he evil" of the Lindbergh law is not
"that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers," but "that it
needlessly encourages them. '' 7 The statute sets up a system which
discourages and deters defendants from "insisting upon their inno-
cence and demanding trial by jury" because death is threatened only
when they do so."
Justice Stewart did not, however, agree with Judge Timbers that
the entire kidnaping statute was void. Rather he decided to excise
4. United States v. Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716 (D. Conn. 1967).
5. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
6. Id. at 583.
7. Id. (emphasis in original).
8. Id.
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merely that portion of the law which authorized the death penalty.
Capital punishment, he reasoned, was added in 1934 simply to in-
crease the penalty for kidnaping, rather than to change the nature
of the offense. As the Court read the legislative record of the statute's
enactment, it was clear that, with or without the death penalty, Con-
gress wished to make kidnaping a federal crime.0
The government had also defended the statute's authorization of
the death penalty only after trial by jury on the ground that it bene-
fited defendants by permitting them to avoid totally the risk of capital
punishment. Justice Stewart replied that the Constitution plainly em-
powered Congress to mitigate the severity of the death penalty, but
that it could not accomplish this end by penalizing defendants who
wished to demand a jury trial.'0
Seven of the sixteen federal death penalty statutes arguably con-
tained the same defect as the Lindbergh law. Additionally, ten states
had adopted one form or another of the Lindbergh procedure as a
device to both limit application of the death penalty and induce
guilty pleas from recalcitrant defendants. New Jersey, for example,
simply provided that a plea of guilty assured a defendant's escape
from a death sentence. LDF prepared to argue that all such laws il-
legally induced pleas of guilty motivated by a desire to avoid capital
punishment.
As Himmelstein revised the "Last Aid Kit" to reflect United States
v. Jackson, Fund lawyers felt that they had turned a corner. The
Supreme Court had not merely demonstrated a willingness to tackle
a murky question of capital case procedure, but had answered the
question in a way which permitted abolitionists to challenge the
practices of states with similar laws. Additionally, the Court had acted
shrewdly by striking down the death penalty provision, but saving the
kidnaping statute. No one could claim that Jackson freed dangerous
criminals.
The second and even more significant 1968 Supreme Court decision
raised further hopes. This one involved William Witherspoon, a man
who had spent eight years on death row in Illinois for murdering a
Chicago police officer. Witherspoon had fifteen dates with the execu-
tioner postponed. While fellow convicts took their last steps past his
cell, he had written two successful books. At the time of his 1960
trial, an Illinois law, similar to statutes in almost every other capital
punishment state, provided that "[i]n trials of murder it shall be a
9. Id. at 586-89.
10. Id. at 582.
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cause for challenging of any juror who shall, on being examined, state
that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that
he is opposed to the same."".
At Witherspoon's trial, the statute was invoked to eliminate nearly
half the prospective jurors. The trial judge announced: "Let's get these
conscientious objectors out of the way, without wasting any time on
them."' 2 In rapid succession, the prosecution successfully challenged
forty-seven jurors on the basis of their attitudes toward the death pen-
alty. Only five of the forty-seven explicitly stated that under no cir-
cumstances could they vote to impose capital punishment. Six said they
"did not believe in the death penalty" and were excused without any
attempt to determine whether their scruples would invariably compel
them to vote against capital punishment. One juror admitted that she
disliked "to be responsible [for] deciding somebody should be put
to death." Without more ado she was also excused. Thus the state
had been able to exclude those with a range of potential objections
to capital punishment from total rejection of the penalty to mild
opposition. It was the constitutionality of this practice the Supreme
Court agreed to consider in Witherspoon v. Illinois.
The circumstances leading up to Witherspoon illustrate the com-
plicated intellectual jockeying that makes the practice of constitutional
law adventurous. Witherspoon, represented by Albert E. Jenner, a
prominent Chicago attorney with a national reputation, wanted the
Court to decide his appeal on the question of bias-i.e., that a jury
without those who have scruples against the death penalty is likely to
be more "prosecution prone" than a jury from which such persons are
not excluded. Jenner relied primarily upon two unpublished opinion
surveys, by psychologists Faye Goldberg and W. Cody Wilson: Both
measured the attitudes of college students, rather than potential jurors,
and neither had been prepared with a view toward legal proceedings,
but both tentatively concluded that jurors without scruples against
capital punishment were more likely to vote for guilt than jurors with
such misgivings.
LDF lawyers feared that this evidence was too slender to hold up
the weight of a major constitutional ruling. The danger was that in
the absence of more reliable research demonstrating that, as a group,
persons in favor of capital punishment were more likely to accept
the prosecution's version of the facts and less likely to credit the ac-
cused's defense, the Court might well reach an adverse decision. Such
11. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 512 n.1 (1968).
12. Id. at 514.
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a defeat would knock out a chief prop of the moratorium strategy.
As Witherspoon's counsel, Jenner was obliged to raise every legal
claim which might possibly win a new trial. If the Fund intervened in
the case as amicus curiae, it might represent the interests of other
death-row inmates and urge the Court to avoid the bias question.
Amsterdam's response to the threat posed by the bias issue was
a ninety-four page amicus brief urging that the sort of factual infor-
mation necessary for a wise decision of the question was not yet avail-
able. Rather Witherspoon's conviction should be reversed on other
grounds: that the jury which convicted and sentenced after exclusion
of scrupled jurors did not reflect a cross-section of the community,
as proved by the fact that several years earlier roughly half of the
adult population questioned had told the Gallup Poll that they en-
tertained some doubts about capital punishment. Under no circum-
stances, the brief argued, should the "prosecution-proneness" issue
be decided on such scanty evidence. Rather than do this, the case
should be sent back to the lower courts for an evidentiary hearing.
This would allow time for facts showing bias to be brought to light.
The Fund, the brief announced, had commissioned the Louis Harris
polling organization to conduct a study of a random sample of poten-
tial capital case jurors. People with the legal qualifications to serve
on capital juries were to be questioned by simulation of the attitudinal
examination employed in actual death cases. Inquiries would probe
whether or not each respondent had any particular objection to capi-
tal punishment.
Other questions measured demographic factors and the attitudes
of potential jurors toward "punitiveness, alienation, prejudice, au-
thoritarianism," in order to determine whether scrupled and non-
scrupled jurors represented different subgroups and personality types.
The study also would test the respondents' perceptions of the "role
and reliability of... the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, jury and
witnesses"' 13 and their reaction to common defense and prosecution
trial tactics. Ability to decide a criminal case on the basis of the evi-
dence would then be measured by questions based on simulated trial
records. Respondents would also be asked to rate the difficulty they
encountered in reaching a decision about the defendant's guilt.
LDF told the Court that it was necessary to wait for the results
of the study, which would serve as a basis for an informed considera-
tion of the "prosecution-proneness" issue. This position was dictated
13. Edison, The Empirical Assault on Capital Punishment, 23 J. LEALL ED. 2, 13 (1971).
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by a wretched fear that someone would be killed by a premature de-
cision on the bias question: If the Court were to decide the issue
before a fuller development of the evidence, its decision would most
likely be adverse. But this strategy placed LDF lawyers in the awkward
position of arguing that Witherspoon might not be entitled to an en-
tire new trial, but only to a new hearing on his sentence. Wither-
spoon's lawyers, however, believed that "prosecution-proneness" was
a winning issue which not only affected their client's death sentence,
but also entitled him to a new trial. Several of Jenner's younger as-
sociates were furious and dashed off angry letters after they read
the Fund's brief. From Witherspoon's personal point of view, they
may have been justifiably upset, but concern for the five hundred
other men on death row forced the Fund to take a contrary position.
Ultimately the Court declined to consider the bias question: It
agreed with the LDF that the available evidence was too "tentative
and fragmentary."'1 In deciding the case, however, Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court as he had in Jackson, took a route treated only
summarily by both Jenner and the Fund and narrowly defined the
issue the Court would decide. It did not involve whether Wither-
spoon's jury was lawfully chosen from a random cross-section of the
community, or deal with the bias question; these issues were reserved
for the future. In this case the Court treated the question of whether
a jury chosen by excluding scrupled jurors could be impartial in de-
termining punishment, not guilt. It held that Witherspoon's jury had
not been impartial because everyone with any objection to the death
penalty had been excluded. The Constitution did not permit the
challenging of jurors with conscientious or religious scruples against
the death penalty so as to produce a "hanging jury."' 5 Justice Stewart
conceded that judges might exclude jurors who would "automatically
vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the
trial might reveal" or who made it "unmistakably clear" that their
opposition to the death penalty would prevent them from even con-
victing a man who might later receive a death sentence.' 0 But more
ambiguous opposition to capital punishment would not be sufficient
to disqualify. Consequently, a full inquiry into each juror's disposi-
tion was necessary before a valid exclusion. As this had not been done
in Witherspoon's case, his death sentence was unlawful.
In the same shrewd way the Jackson Court voided the death penalty
14. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517 (1968).
15. Id. at 523.
16. Id. at 522 n.21 (emphasis in original).
1122
Vol. 82: 1111, 1973
The Strategy Behind Furman
provision but not the entire federal kidnaping statute, the 'Wiher-
spoon Court acted in a manner which diminished the likelihood of
an adverse public reaction. When a case ran afoul of tie l1itherspoon
rule, the death penalty was unconstitutional and had to be vacated,
but it was not necessary to set aside the conviction. (In Bumper v.
North Carolina,17 decided the same day, the Court qualified Wither-
spoon by making it clear that those who had received non-capital sen-
tences from "death-qualified" juries could not complain.)
Initially, Witherspoon gave abolitionist lawyers reason to believe
that no one would ever be executed again, for the decision plainly
added many opponents of capital punishment to the pool of eligible
jurors. Because the rule was retroactive, most death-row inmates, LDF
lawyers thought, had winning claims that their juries had been wrongly
constituted, and were thus entitled to a fresh determination of their
penalty. Others had been sentenced to die by judges, but it might
be possible to argue successfully that these men had waived their
rights to jury trials because they feared trial by the sort of "hanging
jury" the Court had disapproved. Witherspoon seemed to place the
burden on the state to prove that the jury selection process had worked
properly. If the state could not do so, the death sentence must be
quashed.
At the least, then, LDF lawyers expected that there would be hun-
dreds of resentencings before juries which might decline to reimpose
the death penalty. Even defendants who had been condemned by fairly
chosen juries might be saved in the wake of a widespread movement
to reduce death sentences. If these predictions were overly sanguine,
there still remained other capital punishment issues to present to
the Court.
III
It is, in fact, doubtful that anyone, friend or foe, accurately esti-
mated the extent of the reaction to this first hard evidence that abo-
lition was on the Supreme Court's agenda. To be sure, there was no
public outcry similar to the outraged criticism which often greeted
the Warren Court decisions restricting the police. Numerous death sen-
tences were vacated by state and federal courts because of violations
of the Witherspoon rule, though many were quickly reinstated after
new penalty hearings. But the general response of courts that were
asked to apply Witherspoon to other cases, especially state courts, was
17. Bumper v. North Carolina, 591 U.S. 543 (1968).
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hostility all out of proportion to the narrowness of the Witherspoon
rule and the precision of the Supreme Court's opinion.
The lower courts did not, of course, openly defy the Court. That is
not the way the system works. Rather, Witherspoon was, in Amster-
dam's phrase, "cut to ribbons" in the name of assorted legal and fac-
tual differences said by the lower courts to distinguish it from other
cases. Some of these distinctions were obvious makeweights; others
were contorted readings of the Court's opinion. Nevertheless, men
could die on the basis of them. One federal court decided that Wither-
spoon applied to systematic exclusion of scrupled jurors; wrongful re-
moval of a small number of jurors did not count heavily enough to
vacate a death sentence.' 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court stood
Witherspoon on its head by ruling that there was no violation where
an excluded juror's attitude toward capital punishment was am-
biguous. 19 Illinois even enacted a law which proponents thought would
totally avoid the impact of Witherspoon by providing that any man
whose death sentence had been vacated by reason of the decision
would be resentenced by a judge rather than by a jury.2 0
Jackson and Witherspoon thus did not directly threaten the govern-
ment's power to kill; once the states adjusted their criminal procedure
to conform to the new rules, they could continue to impose the death
penalty. But the two decisions did prove that at least some Supreme
Court Justices were prepared to take a hard look at the way men
were condemned. As a result, it became somewhat easier to win post-
ponements of impending executions.
Nevertheless, obtaining a stay of execution was still a tense, un-
certain business. Trial judges had the habit of holding stay applica-
tions in abeyance until shortly before a scheduled execution in the
hope that their governor would postpone it. The result was a series
of almost monthly, mad cross-country scrambles, with secretaries typ-
ing legal papers long into the night and lawyers hurrying them to
faraway appellate judges.
Until the two 1968 decisions increased LDF's leverage, obtaining a
stay of execution also demanded a great deal of coolness under stress.
Although the pressures were great, they were manageable (especially
after the "Last Aid Kit" had been distributed) in states where sched-
uled executions were infrequent. But a year before Jackson and
Witherspoon a more certain method had to be found if executions
18. Bell v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968).
19. New Jersey v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968).
20. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(o) (Smith-Hurd 1972).
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were to be stopped in California and Florida, the states with by far
the largest death-row populations (roughly fifty in Florida, seventy
in California). Each had elected new governors in 1965, and both
Ronald Reagan and Claude Kirk had campaigned on "law and order"
platforms, making a minor campaign issue out of the failure of their
predecessors to use the death penalty as a deterrent to crime.
During his election campaign Kirk made his intentions known
dramatically by visiting the Florida State Penitentiary at Raiford. He
shook hands with the inmates of death row, and with a courteous
smile told them, "If I'm elected, I may have to sign your death war-
rant." After the election he made his campaign promise good by
signing a handful of death warrants which had gathered dust on the
desk of the previous governor, Farris Bryant.
For many years the opponents of capital punishment in Florida had
been led by Tobias Simon, a puckish, free-wheeling Miami lawyer who
was both an LDF cooperating attorney and chairman of the state
chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union. While ostensibly in
private practice, Simon was a maverick, temperamentally unable to ac-
cept the quiet life of a commercial lawyer. Whenever there was a civil
rights skirmish, a teacher strike, or an antiwar protest in Florida, Simon
surfaced on the side of the insurgents. He had the reputation of being
a man who would try anything once-and sometimes twice.
When Kirk threatened to resume executions, Simon and Alfred
Feinberg, his young associate and a former Legal Defense Fund staff
member, devised a novel lawsuit to stop him. After the smoke had
cleared, it was apparent that they had tapped a new willingness on
the part of the judiciary to hear arguments against capital punishment.
Simon and his ACLU colleagues represented several of the men in
grave danger of electrocution. Hence, they were able to initiate individ-
ual lawsuits asserting that each man's death sentence was unconstitu-
tional because of the deficiencies which Fund legal papers had identi-
fied, as well as raising issues particular to each inmate's case. Simon and
Feinberg felt that the most pressing concern was the inmates who
were not represented by lawyers. Angered by Kirk's posturing, they
feared that he would execute one of the many men on death row who
had no lawyer, no concerned friends, and no pending lawsuit. There
were men on death row who risked execution simply because they
did not know how to file a suit to block it. The lawyers' anxiety
grew after state officials refused to divulge the name and status of
every death-row inmate. If there was anything unconstitutional in
the state's administration of the death penalty, Simon and Feinberg
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reasoned, all Florida death penalties suffered from identical defects
of procedure.
On this premise, Simon decided that death-row inmates represented
a class which could be joined in one proceeding. If such a suit was
proper, the courts would have to postpone all executions until they
finally decided whether the legal rights of the inmates had been
infringed.
But though the class action device is a common lawyer's tool in
civil cases, it had never been used successfully to challenge the con-
victions or sentences of all the criminals who might benefit from a
particular decision. It had always been assumed that each convicted
criminal had to present a claim that he was entitled to release, a new
trial, or a different sentence individually, in a separate proceeding.
It was thus with considerable skepticism that I heard Feinberg's
hurried telephone description of the proposed law-suit. I tried to be
polite, but privately I thought, "Another Toby Simon frolic." At
my suggestion, Feinberg added language to the draft petition asking
the court to grant a declaratory judgment, and to declare the consti-
tutional rights of all death-row inmates to sentencing standards and
other procedural practices if it could not actually decide their cases
together.
Several days later surprise replaced skepticism when United States
District Judge William A. McRae ruled that there was enough sub-
stance to the class action idea to justify a temporary stay. Judge Mc-
Rae prohibited Florida from executing anyone until he had had an
opportunity to decide what to do with the unusual suit, and called
for legal memoranda. Simon's daring had paid off.
Amsterdam, Greenberg, and Simon immediately flew to Boston to
discuss the class action question with Harvard law professor Albert
M. Sachs. As a consultant to the committee that revised the federal
rules of civil procedure, Sachs knew a great deal about class actions,
He also had access to Benjamin Kaplan, the Harvard professor who
had drafted the pertinent rule-Rule 23.21 Sachs thought the suit was
a long shot, but said there was no solid doctrinal reason why an
argument under Rule 23 could not be sustained.
Amsterdam agreed to try to put the argument on paper. After
returning to New York he worked out the theory that habeas was
merely a form of procedure for the protection of human liberty, but
one which had greatly and consistently evolved to respond to new
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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threats to liberty. Habeas ought to be sufficiently flexible to meet
the needs of this case if it was the only vehicle by which the unrep-
resented man on death row could obtain access to a court.
This argument thus required a factual investigation of the legal
situation, financial condition, and literacy of the men on death row.
This pleased Amsterdam, for it avoided forcing Judge McRae to
decide a difficult procedural issue until he had seen the hard facts
depicting the hopeless legal plight of the unrepresented men. It also
postponed decision on the class action issue until a time when the
initial adverse public reaction to the Judge's order had subsided. Fi-
nally, if Judge McRae refused to permit the investigation, Amster-
dam could go to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on a record show-
ing that the district judge had refused to let the lawyers gather facts
showing that the class action device was the only method of pro-
cedure whereby Raiford's unrepresented condemned men could be
heard in court.
Four months later Judge McRae agreed that the use of a class action
depended on whether or not death-row inmates had effective access
to the courts. Where they without lawyers? Were they poor, ignorant,
or illiterate, and thereby unable to protect themselves by retaining
an attorney or filing their own habeas corpus petitions in court? If
the answer to these questions was yes, a class suit might be the only
way they could assert their legal claims.
In order to find out the answers, Judge McRae accepted an ACLU-
LDF offer to interview each consenting death-row inmate and report
back to the court. Amsterdam prepared a questionnaire, Simon sched-
uled the interviews, and they both put together a task force of ACLU
volunteers, LDF cooperating lawyers, and law students who went to
Raiford to inquire into the background, employment, education, prior
criminal record, financial status, and legal representation of each in-
mate who agreed to talk to them.
When the job was done Simon had a profile of forty of the fifty-two
men on death row to present to Judge McRae. Of these, thirty-four
had already lost their appeals to the Florida Supreme Court and were
subject to electrocution at Governor Kirk's whim unless new legal
proceedings were brought on their behalf. As Simon had feared, half
of these thirty-four had no lawyers or means to hire them; all but
six of the other half were represented by the small group of ACLU-
LDF lawyers. Fourteen of the men were unskilled laborers; seven
were farm laborers; thirty-seven of the forty were entirely destitute,
and the remaining three reported having less than a hundred dollars.
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At the time of the interviews, death-row inmates were also given the
Beta test, a nonverbal IQ test commonly used to test prisoners in or-
der to measure their likely understanding of legal proceedings. If suf-
ficient numbers were of subnormal intelligence, it would be strong
evidence that they could not have taken even the initial steps neces-
sary to bring their cases to court and that therefore a class action was
necessary to protect their interests. Here again, Simon's position was
vindicated. The mean IQ for the group of forty men was 88.35 (80
to 89 is considered "low average"), and the mean number of years
of school attendance was 8.62. Further, when the inmates were di-
vided into three groups, those with non-ACLU-LDF counsel had had
the highest IQ-almost normal; those without counsel had lower IQ's
-distinctly subnormal; and those with ACLU-LDF counsel had the
lowest IQ's of all. The lawyers later argued that the results demon-
strated that helpless men were without help-though the private joke
was that any death-row inmate with any brains was too smart to want
ACLU-LDF counsel.
The results of the interviews and tests were forwarded to Judge
McRae and a hearing was scheduled. Amsterdam flew to Jacksonville
to tell the Judge that the unrepresented, ignorant, and indigent men
of Raiford's death row must be heard in one case for want of the
ability to institute and maintain individual legal proceedings de-
signed to secure their rights. The climax of his plea was: "They will
be heard together or they will be electrocuted individually. There is
no third possibility." Months later Judge McRae decided that the
class action was proper.22 He continued the prohibition on execution
and told the lawyers that he would consider their arguments about
Florida capital punishment laws.
As soon as Simon's unusual lawsuit and its unexpected result had
become generally known, civil rights lawyers in several other capital
punishment states implored the Fund to assist them in bringing their
own class actions. With the exception of California, where a class
suit was brought, Amsterdam, Himmelstein, and I actively discour-
aged duplication of the Florida case. This was a difficult decision
to communicate to the harassed lawyers, many of whom saw a single
lawsuit directed from New York as relieving the endless rounds of
litigation in scores of death cases. Although there were compelling
reasons to avoid presenting the courts with a series of death-row class
actions, it was only because judicial abolition had become a national
22. Adderly v. Wainwright, 46 F.R.D. 97 (M.D. Fla. 1968). See also Adderly v. Wain-
wright, 272 F. Supp. 530 (M.D. Fla. 1967).
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movement, of which the Fund was acknowledged leader, that these
reasons were generally accepted by the interested lawyers. Nevertheless,
it took great powers of persuasion to restrain them. Take Amsterdam's
1967 letter to a Louisiana lawyer:
I have discussed the question of a Louisiana class action to
invalidate the death penalty with [a Louisiana civil rights
lawyer] ....
The short of the matter is that I have urged him strenuously
not to begin any such suit ....
The Florida and California cases originated in intense neces-
sity. The governors of those States had begun signing death war-
rants wholesale, and literally dozens of men were going to die if
something was not done. The state and federal judges in the areas
were not bold enough to keep stepping into the whirlvind and
snatching out individual condemned men. A class action was
necessary to save life, and we filed one in each state.
The legal problems with such class lawsuits are staggering. Quite
apart from substantive problems, the procedural questions in-
volved in class action habeas, exhaustion of state remedies, federal
injunction of state court judgments, res judicata, etc. are limitless,
vexing and extremely difficult. Take it from me. I have spent the
past couple of months on virtually nothing else.
Now, in the Florida and California actions, we have just about
gotten our toes on the beach. We have won the most limited,
provisional and precarious kind of interlocutory victories . ...
What we do not need-what would be a disaster in these two
cases involving one hundred and ten human lives-is the back-
wash of some third lawsuit which, if it fortuitously lands before
an unsympathetic district judge in a third State, could result in
a decisive dismissal with an opinion saying we are all wet. We
would then have to go prematurely and precipitously to some
Court of Appeals which-on hastily prepared briefs and an in-
adequate record-could well make a ruling that kills not merely
the third lawsuit, but the Florida and California ones as well.
I myself am involved in the representation of condemned men
in at least eight States other than Florida and California. I would
not for one moment consider a class action suit in any of those
States . . . So long as individual habeas corpus petitions -d
like traditional remedies on traditional legal grounds will suffice
to keep these men out of the chair, we are using them. It is in
their best interest that we do so. It is in the best interest of one
hundred and ten men in Florida and California. It is in the best
interest of hundreds of other condemned men, in other States,
whose fortunes ride on the outcome of the Florida and California
suits.
In the last few weeks, I have spoken to a number of attorneys
in a number of States who contacted me because they were in-
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terested in bringing suits of this character. I have explained to
each why I thought they should not, and they have universally
agreed. The plain fact is that death cases are not occasions for
venturesomeness in litigation. They are not cases in which mak-
ing litigation is desirable. Test litigation is well and good, but not
with human life at stake. There are enough occasions when one
has to go to court to save life that is in immediate jeopardy, and
it is these cases . . . that must be made the test cases.
As I understand the Louisiana situation, it presents no such
case. No death warrants have been signed for three years. There
are no men who are in immediate jeopardy of dying; and, if one
or two should come close, they have plenty of traditional rem-
edies to hold the fort. Under these circumstances, I cannot see
a class action as anything but a gratuitous gamble with many,
many lives ....
While Judge McRae pondered the legal issues involved in the Flori-
da death-row case, Ronald Reagan began to make good on his election
promises. California's first execution in four years took place on April
12, 1967, the day before Judge McRae stayed all Florida executions.
Aaron Mitchell, the thirty-eight-year-old black killer of a white Sac-
ramento policeman, went to his death in the San Quentin gas chan-
ber. While he bled from an unsuccessful suicide attempt with a razor
blade, Mitchell chanted to Byron E. Eshelman, the prison chaplain,
"I am the second coming of Jesus Christ. ' 2 3 Hours after the execution
the Judiciary Committee of the California State Senate voted down
an abolition bill. After Mitchell died the California way-by suffo-
cation from the fumes of a mixture of cyanide and sulphuric acid-
with Reagan's men scheduling new death dates, a class suit similar to
Simon's Florida case was desperately needed.
Leroy Clark and Charles Stephen Ralston, soon to be appointed
Director of the Fund's San Francisco office, were in California at
the time. They set up a conference call with Jack Greenberg in New
York and after discussion decided to find a group of California at-
torneys willing to put the case together. Ralston got in touch with
Gerald Marcus, a San Francisco attorney who headed an organization
called Californians Against Capital Punishment. The next day Marcus
agreed to arrange a meeting of interested attorneys, most of whom
were volunteer lawyers for the American Civil Liberties Union of
Northern California (ACLUNC).
One of the members of the group was Paul Halvonik, who had
23. Eshelman, San Quentin's Last Execution, Sunday Examiner and Chronicle (San
Francisco), May 7, 1972, at 40.
1130
Vol. 82: 1111, 1973
The Strategy Behind Furman
joined the staff of ACLUNC in November of 1966. Since by that year
both the National ACLU and the Southern California ACLU affiliate
had decided that abolition of the death penalty raised a civil liberties
issue, Halvonik had been under the mistaken impression that ACLUNG
would support pending legislation to abolish the California death pen-
alty. His mistake quickly turned into a source of acute embarrassment
when he was forced to inform Senator Moscone, author of the prin-
cipal California death penalty repeal bill, that ACLUNG would not
formally support his legislation. Embarrassment turned to horror when
Reagan let Mitchell die.
Before Mitchell's execution Halvonik had decided to do what he
could to change the Northern California affiliate's policy. He ap-
proached Marshall Krause, who was then ACLUNC's Staff Counsel,
with the idea of gathering a few death-row inmates for the purpose
of a class action death-row suit. Krause agreed to put the matter to
the Board of Directors once Halvonik represented a death-row client.
Halvonik immediately contacted several lawyers representing men on
the row. Before they could agree how to proceed, Halvonik found
himself staring at a headline story in the Berkeley Gazette: A Florida
judge had issued a class action stay for that state's death row. "Imag-
ine," he thought, "some hotshot lawyer has come up with my idea."
Spurred by Judge McRae's action, Halvonik entered serious nego-
tiation with Gary Berger, Roy Eisenhardt, Jerome Falk, and Harry
Kreamer, all of whom represented death-row inmates. When Marcus
invited the group to meet with Amsterdam, Clark, and Ralston, they
accepted readily. After several meetings there was general agreement
that a California class action modeled on Simon's suit should be quick-
ly filed in federal court and, if possible, timed so that it might be
assigned to a sympathetic judge. The one problem that emerged was
a Civil Liberties Union policy against joining other organizations in
bringing lawsuits. No one doubted that the ACLUNC Board would
waive the noncooperation policy when it was brought to their atten-
tion, but the Board did not meet again for a month. The affiliate's
executive director could waive the rule, but he was not inclined to
do so.
The individual volunteer lawyers, however, made it clear that
they were ready to work with the Fund even if ACLUNC did not
participate. Halvonik decided that if necessary he would moonlight.
With their help, Clark adapted the papers from the Florida case to
fit California's somewhat different laws governing capital trials and
hurriedly presented them to a San Francisco federal court, where they
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were assigned to Judge Robert E. Peckham, a forty-seven-year-old ex-
state judge whom Lyndon Johnson had appointed the previous year.
Jerome Falk explained the case and argued for a class stay. The
fledgling lawyer, who had clerked for Justice Douglas, was to become
one of the most highly respected attorneys in the state, but in 1967
he had practiced law for less than a year. By the time the brief
hearing was concluded, Falk's stomach was in knots.
"Whatever anyone else may remember in retrospect," Halvonik re-
calls, "I remember quite vividly that none of us were sanguine about
our prospects for success. On the day prior to the filing of the suit,
I took some papers over to Leroy Clark who was working in Marcus'
office. I handed the research to Leroy, he looked at me, smiled pain-
fully and said, 'If nothing else comes of this, you have to admire my
sheer nerve in going down and filing this thing.' I did."
On the day the suit was filed Clark felt compelled to tell the press
that he was not "show boating" and that he was quite "serious" about
the suit. So was Judge Peckham. On July 5, 1967, with Judge Mc-
Rae's example before him and a dozen California inmates scheduled
for execution, he prohibited California from killing anyone until he
decided whether a class action was proper.2 4
In Florida, lawyers from the state attorney general's office had
accepted, although begrudgingly, Judge McRae's stay of all execu-
tions until he determined whether death-row inmates were permitted
to maintain a class action. But the Democratic attorney general of
California, Thomas Lynch, was not going to let Reagan, a Republican,
stand alone as the defender of capital punishment. Two days after
Judge Peckham issued his order, Lynch's office applied to the Ninth
Circuit for a writ that would set aside the stay.
A hearing was set for the following Monday. One of the lawyers
immediately called a circuit judge to request additional time to pre-
pare a brief, but the judge refused. "You fellows are always filing
these things at the last moment," he commented. The judge ob-
viously thought this was another case of a death-row inmate seeking
a late-hour postponement. He remained unconvinced when the lawyer
patiently explained that "he" had not filed "this thing" at all-the
attorney general had-much less at the last minute. "After all," the
judge added, "there's an execution set for Tuesday."
While an attempt such as Attorney General Lynch's to persuade
federal appellate courts to interfere with ongoing proceedings in trial
24. Hill v. Nelson, 271 F. Supp. 439, 444 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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courts is rarely successful, the Ninth Circuit did not have a favorable
track record on the issues which made up the Fund's challenge and
it might well have been tempted to overrule Judge Peckham. If Lynch
succeeded, several unrepresented men would die almost immediately,
and the effect on Judge McRae's resolve might be literally fatal. With
but three days remaining to meet the attorney general's challenge,
Amsterdam flew from Philadelphia to San Francisco. With the as-
sistance of the volunteer lawyers, he produced a heavily documented
seventy-two page brief in defense of the stay. Halvonik also pitched
in and helped. He had persuaded his superiors that the Board of Di-
rectors would be upset if the ACLUNG received no credit for the
work that was being done. (Later, the board approved participation in
the case.)
On Monday as scheduled, Amsterdam told three circuit judges that
while death-row inmates had a "vital" interest in remaining alive
to assert any rights they might have, California had no such weighty
interest in killing them before a final decision in their case. The
hearing was short; the judges were anxious to be off for a judicial
conference in Seattle. Within an hour after the argument, while an
exhausted Amsterdam stood before television cameras that had been
set up at the courthouse, the court turned down the attorney general's
plea.
Judge Peckham's authority to hear the case now had been estab-
lished, but a month later he decided not to take Judge McRae's route.
Uncertain of his authority, he would not consider the case as a class
action. Nevertheless, he thought that he did have the power to give
the lawyers access to San Quentin's death row and to require the
state to notify them of scheduled executions so that individual habeas
petitions could be filed for every death-sentenced California prisoner.
Once such petitions were filed, stays of execution would be granted
automatically: "Justice requires that no condemned man who has
standing to raise any federal constitutional issue . ..should be ex-
ecuted until such question is finally adjudicated." 23
Leroy Clark was bitterly disappointed that Judge Peckham had
not agreed to hear the case as a class action and correctly predicted
that other California federal judges would not easily agree to grant
automatic stays of execution. Halvonik and Falk would make many
"last moment" runs to court to get them. But Judge Peckham had
set in motion events which tied the hands of the California execu-
25. Hill v. Nelson, 272 F. Supp. 790, 795 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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tioner. In the course of considering whether to entertain the class
action, he had ruled that several of the constitutional questions raised
in the case had never been presented to the California state courts,
and that before a federal judge decided them, state judicial remedies
had to be exhausted.
The lawyers were delighted to comply. A set of habeas petitions
was soon presented to the California Supreme Court in the names
of Robert Page Anderson and Frederick Saterfield, two murderers
whose executions had been scheduled. The court was asked to refer
the cases to an impartial fact-finder and to order him to hear testi-
mony from expert witnesses regarding several of the constitutional
claims, such as the physical and psychological cruelty of the death pen-
alty. If given the opportunity to make a factual demonstration of the
cruelty of execution, Amsterdam and Himmelstein were prepared to
put on the witness stand the social and behavioral scientists, crimi-
nologists, and wardens whom they had cultivated over the months.
But a lengthy factual inquiry into capital punishment was not on
the agenda of the California Supreme Court. The judges would con-
sider legal arguments against the death penalty but would not re-
ceive oral testimony. Nevertheless, on November 14, 1967, the day
before a man named Robert Lee Massie was to be executed, the
court on its own initiative entered a stay of all executions in the
state. Six months later the court convened in a crowded San Francisco
courtroom to hear the arguments of counsel. Amsterdam represented
Anderson and Saterfield; a veteran attorney, Albert W. Harris, rep-
resented the state, and civil libertarians Abraham Lincoln Wirin and
Gerald Gottlieb appeared for the ACLU as amicus. Several of the
judges seemed interested and sympathetic to the abolitionist position,
and as Amsterdam left the courtroom, after having fielded friendly
questions from four of them-a majority of the court-he felt re-
lieved. California seemed safe, at least until the court reached a de-
cision.
It took almost eight months for the seven members of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court to decide the case brought on behalf of An-
derson and Saterfield. When the result was announced,2 0 the aboli-
tionist position had failed by an eyelash.
In a lengthy opinion by Justice Louis H. Burke, the court held
by a vote of 4 to 3 (with Justice Mathew Trobiner, Chief Justice
Roger C. Traynor, and Justice Raymond Peters dissenting) that capi-
26. In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 447 P.2d 117, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1968).
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tal punishment as administered by California was not cruel and un-
usual punishment, and that the Constitution did not require legal
standards for the guidance of the jury. The court did, however, order
new penalty trials for Anderson and Saterfield, on the ground that
several persons had been excluded from their juries in violation of
the Supreme Court's Witherspoon decision.2-
Of the seven justices on the court, four wrote opinions. As the
losers, LDF lawyers were disappointed with Justice Burke's reason-
ing, but welcomed Justice Trobiner's dissent because it contributed
an approach which could be used to advantage in other courts: the
notion that Witherspoon required a total reexamination by lower
courts of capital sentencing procedures.28 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Marshall McComb added that he did not even agree that An-
derson and Saterfield should have an opportunity to be resentenced
(to death or to a possibly lighter sentence).2 9
The lawyers were surprised that they had come within one vote
of success, even though the California Supreme Court had been long
reputed the most progressive state supreme court, because no court
had ever come close to ruling that a jury could not sentence a man
to death without some legal principles governing its decisions. But
if the margin of defeat was unexpectedly slim, the manner of defeat
was totally unpredictable. The crucial vote that swung the court
against Anderson and Saterfield was that of Justice Stanley Mosk,
a former attorney general of California and an outspoken opponent
of the death penalty for many years prior to his judicial appointment.
Mosk's brief explanation of his decisive vote could only harden
the opposition to abolition of those judges who disliked tie death
penalty but lacked confidence in their authority to end it:
In my years as Attorney General of California (1959-1964), I
frequently repeated a personal belief in the social invalidity of the
death penalty, notably in testimony before California legislative
committees in March 1959, July 1960, and April 1963.
Naturally, therefore, I am tempted by the invitation of peti-
tioners to join in judicially terminating this anachronistic pen-
alty. However, to yield to my predilections would be to act will-
fully "in the sense of enforcing individual views instead of
speaking humbly as the voice of law by which society presum-
ably consents to be ruled.. . ." (Frankfurter, The Supreme Court
27. Id. at 617, 447 P.2d at 120. 78 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
28. Id. at 686, 447 P.2d at 133, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
29. Id. at 669, 447 P.2d at 155, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
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in the Mirror of the Justices (1957), 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 794.)
As a judge, I am bound to the law as I find it to be and not as
I might fervently wish it to be.30
Coming from a known abolitionist like Justice Mosk, such rea-
soning struck like a blow to the midsection. LDF lawyers thought
the death penalty was irrational as well as inhumane, but unwise and
immoral laws are not necessarily unconstitutional. By invoking Felix
Frankfurter's philosophy that judges must exercise enormous restraint
in construing constitutional provisions to invalidate legislation, Justice
Mosk stood on .what many regarded as hallowed ground.
In the months that followed the decision, Anderson, Saterfield, and
other California death-row inmates joined a parade of appeals to the
Supreme Court of the United States, totally disarranging Jerome
Falk's previously untroubled practice of real estate and tax law. Falk,
along with Amsterdam, Himmelstein, Halvonik, and Ralston, spent
hundreds of hours either preparing the necessary petitions or finding
volunteers to do the job. Many were written half in New York, half
in California and put together by cross-country phone. One of these
cases illustrates the care and tact they brought to this work and, not
incidentally, the range of problems that had been taken on when the
Fund decided that death row was part of its constituency.
In 1965, Robert Lee Massie had been convicted of robbery, assault
with intent to commit murder, and murder, and sentenced to death.
An appeal to the California Supreme Court proved unsuccessful. An
execution date was set for October 10, 1967, and later postponed first
to November 2 and then to November 15. Massie wrote to his attor-
ney, Roger S. Hanson, requesting that Hanson take no further action
in his behalf: He wished to die. Massie also wrote to Justice Douglas,
Chief Justice Traynor, and Judge Peckham, informing them that lie
desired no interference with his execution.
Thirty-six hours before Massie was due to die in the gas chamber,
Judge Peckham asked Hanson and Falk to find out if he might change
his mind. By the time the two lawyers drove across the Golden Gate
Bridge to San Quentin, normal visitor facilities were closed for the
night. Hanson and Falk were escorted through the darkened prison
onto death row, admitted to a cell, and permitted to speak to the
condemned man. A guard stood by the door with a shotgun. Massie
was adamant about his wish to be executed, and he treated Falk as an
interloper. Falk suddenly realized that he was in a tiny room with a
30. id. at 634-35, 447 P.2d at 131-32, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36.
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man who said he wanted to die, and that all that Massie need do to
have his wish would be to force the guard to shoot. "I continued to
listen to Massie," Falk reported, "but his words kept mingling with
thoughts of ricocheting shotgun pellets."
The next morning, despite Massie's stubborn wish to die, Falk
pressed Judge Peckham to halt the execution until he could determine
whether Massie was sane. Falk poised to an affidavit obtained from
Dr. Bernard Diamond, an experienced psychiatrist on the Berkeley
faculty. Although Diamond had not examined Massie, he had con-
cluded on the basis of Massie's background and public statements
that there was a reasonable probability that he was suffering from seri-
ous mental illness and was therefore incapable of exercising nornal
judgment as to what was in his best interest.
While the lawyers waited for Judge Peckham to decide whether to
stay the execution, a reporter burst through the courtroom door and
announced that the California Supreme Court had stayed all execu-
tions in the state. Hanson and Falk subsequently filed a habeas pe-
tition in the California Supreme Court asking for a determination
of Massie's sanity. After its November 1968 decision in Anderson and
Saterfield, the court denied the petition and an appeal was taken on
Massie's behalf to the United States Supreme Court. But Massie again
attempted to thwart efforts to save him by filing his own motion to
dismiss the petition for review, arguing that as a party to the petition
he no longer had any interest in the issue being litigated-i.e., his
own life. Under the Supreme Court rules, dismissal appeared to be
his right.
Massie was not unusual in employing the death penalty to realize
a death wish. An amicus curiae brief filed by the American Psychiatric
Association in a Supreme Court capital case identified three groups
for whom capital punishment served as an incitement to kill rather
than a deterrent: those who felt that the death penalty was a just
punishment for their wrongdoing, and so might murder to bring it
about; those to whom the risk of danger had an attraction; and those
lured by the prospect of a spectacular trial and public attention.31
Massie's request that the Supreme Court dismiss his case squarely
presented the question of whether he had the right to be executed
by the state notwithstanding that litigation might eliminate his death
sentence. On December 2, 1969, Falk and Amsterdam took the only
route consistent with legal ethics that might thwart Massie's wish
31. Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae at 5.6, Maxmell v.
Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
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to die. They drafted a letter informing the United States Supreme
Court of the case and urged that "if Massie is to be the first man
to be executed in California in thirty-one months, and the first man in
the nation since June 1967," surely that should only happen after "a
fair determination . . . that his conviction and death sentence are
constitutionally valid" or that he is legally competent to waive any
constitutional claims that he might have.
Massie's case also raised questions which went to the heart of the
lawyer-client relationship. It is, of course, generally the client who
defines his interests, while the advocate serves only to accomplish them.
But does a man have a right to demand that the state kill him-if
killing by the state is unconstitutional-by dismissing his attorney, by
failing to pursue legal proceedings? If there is any truth to the assertion
of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility that the law-
yer's "highest loyalty" is to "those fundamental processes of govern-
ment and self-government upon which the successful functioning of
our society depends,"32 then the attorney's course is not dictated sole-
ly by his client's death wish.
For Amsterdam and Falk the matter was complicated by the fact
that Massie's death would have affected every other death-row inmate
by breaking the moratorium, which was by then over two years old.
They took grateful refuge from the agonizing dilemma in the pos-
sibility of Massie's insanity, which, if established, would destroy his
capacity, legal as well as moral, to choose between life and death.
In the April 1971 issue of Esquire magazine, Massie publicly aired
his position by publishing a blistering condemnation of "NAACP
lawyers" who alleged in numerous courts without "supporting evi-
dence" that he was insane. He could sympathize with men on death
row who claimed that they had been convicted without sentencing
standards, but he could not see how their cases applied to him. "I pled
guilty to first degree murder and was tried by a judge, not a jury."
Massie did not advocate capital punishment; indeed, he thought it the
utmost hypocrisy in a Christian. But now that he was sentenced to
death, he found that death was far preferable to life imprisonment,
"a fate worse than death." His plea for a speedy end is worth quoting
at length:
[I]t is only fitting that my life should culminate in the gas
chamber. From the time I was seven years old I have been a
ward of the State. From the years of seven to ten I was placed
32. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.BA.J. 1159,
1162 (1958).
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in a number of foster homes; from eleven to fourteen I lived in
the state reformatory (euphemistically called a "Training School
for Boys"); and from fifteen to twenty-three, I was in jails and
penitentiaries. Finally, at the age of twenty-three I was delivered
to the Warden at San Quentin, where it is hoped that I will
shortly graduate to the merciful oblivion called death. It is readily
apparent that my years of penal servitude have not helped me,
nor has it helped society. Therefore, what would be gained by
spending the rest of my natural life in prison? I have never con-
tributed anything worthwhile to society and never will.
For what reason should I strive to have my judgment of death
reduced to life in prison? If life on earth such a blessing or so
precious that I should be desirous of spending it in a dehuman-
ized hellhole of steel and concrete where the law of the jungle
and degeneracy reign supreme, where all human and moral values
are considered a weakness? . . Rotting away in prison for the
rest of my days and deteriorating mentally, perhaps even going
completely insane is not a very pleasing incentive for continuing
to cling to this life.33
Brave, moving words, and certainly not written by a madman.
Several years later, however, when subsequent events had dramatically
changed his legal situation, Massie had mellowed enough to ask Jerry
Falk to be his lawyer.
The events that changed Massie's legal status were, of course, first
the decision of the California Supreme Court that capital punishment
violated the "cruel or unusual punishment" Clause of the California
Constitution,34 and second the decision of the Supreme Court in
Furman.35 In both cases, the LDF-ACLU lawyers served as counsel
and today, amidst a growing national controversy over the wisdom and
constitutionality of mandatory capital punishment laws, they continue
to be active in efforts to insure that the machinery of legal death is
never restored.
33. Massie, Death by Degrees, EsQuIE, Apr. 1971, at 179.
24. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
35. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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